Segregation and Social Participation
Manifestations, Impacts, Responses

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Four questions

1. What are the levels of (social, ethnic) – spatial/urban – inequality in European cities? About segregation and concentration
2. How can we understand the variation of these urban inequalities?
3. What can we say about the effects of urban inequality?
4. What are the typical policy responses to urban inequality in European cities?
Context: levels of social inequality, within and between states.

Social inequality in selected European cities; segregation indexes

- USA 100 largest cities poor
- Antwerp 'poor'
- Rotterdam 5th quintile
- Amsterdam 5th quintile
- Copenhagen 10th decile
- Milan professionals
- Oslo social assistance
- Amsterdam 5th quintile metro
- Rotterdam 1st quintile
- Berlin hh income > € 3500
- Amsterdam 1st quintile
- Milan blue collar workers
- Berlin hh income < € 900
- Bern unemployed
- Amsterdam 1st quintile metro
- Copenhagen 1st quintile
Ethnic inequality: segregation level (D) and recent change (difference between years mentioned)

Sources: Arbaci (2007); Friedrichs (1998); Malheiros (2002a, b); Martori et al. (2005); Musterd (2005) (1996); Peach (1996); Stillwell & Phillips (2006)
Type of index is relevant:

D dissimilarity
upper half

xPx * isolation
lower half

1994-2009
Amsterdam, Surinamese origin, 2009, n > 50, > 2sd

Concentrations:
Surinamese in 2009
Total in the city: 68761 (9.09%)
N Surinamese per area: >= 50
Perc. Surinamese in concentrations >= 17.83
110 concentrations with (total):
90087 inhabitants
30227 Surinamese (33.6%)
30227: 43.9% of all Surinamese
562.4 hectares
Amsterdam, Surinamese origin, 2009, n > 50, > 4sd

Concentrations:
Surinamese in 2009
Total in the city: 68761 (9.09%) 
N Surinamese per area: >= 50
Perc. Surinamese in concentrations >=26.52
61 concentrations with (total):
67539 inhabitants
25427 Surinamese (37.6%)
25427: 36.9% of all Surinamese
419.4 hectares
Amsterdam, Surinamese origin, 2009, n > 50, > 50%

Concentrations:
- Surinamese in 2009
- Total in the city: 68761 (9.09%)
- N Surinamese per area: >= 50
- Perc. Surinamese in concentrations >=50%
- 5 concentrations with (total): 3245 inhabitants
- 1848 Surinamese (56.9%)
- 1848: 2.7 % of all Surinamese
- 27.9 hectares

©Stadsmonitor Amsterdam 8-7-2011
Amsterdam, Surinamese origin, 2009, n > 50, > 60%

Concentrations:
Surinamese in 2009
Total in the city: 68761 (9.09%)
N Surinamese per area: >= 50
Perc. Surinamese in concentrations >=60%
2 concentrations with (total):
753 inhabitants
469 Surinamese (62.3%)
469: 0.7% of all Surinamese
6.1 hectares
Amsterdam 2008, concentrations with > 50% non-western immigrants (together 65% of all non-western immigrants)
Amsterdam 2008, concentrations with > 75% non-western immigrants (together 19% of all non-western immigrants)
Amsterdam 2008, concentrations with > 85% non-western immigrants (together 1.7% of all non-western immigrants)
City Monitor Amsterdam
Urban Geography
University of Amsterdam

http://mapinfoserver.fmg.uva.nl/amsterdam/
## Concentrations of ethnic categories in Amsterdam 2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic category</th>
<th>Category’s city population</th>
<th>Percentage of category in city</th>
<th>Category’s concentration population</th>
<th>Total concentration population</th>
<th>Percentage of category in concentrations</th>
<th>Category’s concentration population relative to category’s city population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Turkish</td>
<td>39654</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>16102</td>
<td>68532</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>40.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moroccan</td>
<td>68099</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>32446</td>
<td>91235</td>
<td>35.6</td>
<td>47.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surinamese</td>
<td>68761</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>23511</td>
<td>61710</td>
<td>38.1</td>
<td>34.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antillean</td>
<td>11559</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>16895</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>17.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Share of four population categories in the city of Amsterdam, 2000-2009, based on country of origin (1st and 2nd generation) (column 3)
Percentage of each of the population categories relative to total population, in concentrations of these population categories (column 6)

![Graph showing the percentage of each population category relative to total population over the years 2000 to 2009. The categories include Turkish, Moroccan, Surinamese, and Antillean.]
Percentage of each of the population categories that lives in concentrations of these population categories (column 7)
In short:

• Social segregation is moderate and highest for high-status groups
• Ethnic segregation levels are moderate and not generally increasing
• Ethnic concentrations only regard part of the ethnic population (no serious ghetto)
• Ethnic concentrations tend to be dynamic
How can we understand urban inequalities?

- Globalisation
- Internationalisation
- Economic restructuring
- Path dependency ((un) fit for current urban economies; multi-layered or single-layered)
- Welfare state model
- Other: culture, tolerance, discrimination, political discourse, relative choice
Welfare states and levels of social inequality

Segregation index

residual

hybrid

extensive

universal
3 Urban inequalities, effects on participation; theory

Mechanisms

• Socialisation, role models, peer groups
• Stigmatisation
• Social networks

In Europe, hypotheses

• Lower levels of segregation $\rightarrow$ small effects
• Perhaps even $\rightarrow$ positive effects
Effects of urban inequalities, methods

- Large datasets
- Longitudinal
- Rich in terms of variables
- Detailed geo-coding available
- Techniques that can cope with selection effects
- Techniques that detect non-linearities, thresholds, etc.
15 examples of results of large-scale longitudinal, individual level studies in Sweden and The Netherlands (between 1991-2006) on the impact of neighbourhood composition (various sizes and compositions (ethnic, social, tenure)) on social outcomes (mostly income)


Sweden

1. Income mix variables have the strongest effects (percentage low income households).

2. Proportions of specific groups matter more than general diversity or balance.

3. Effects are generally stronger in metropolitan than in non-metropolitan areas and stronger for males than for females.

4. Own group ethnic concentrations can initially pay dividends for immigrants, but these benefits turn into disadvantages over time, after approx. two years.

5. The impact of other immigrants turned out positive only if unemployment levels are very low.
Sweden continued

6. For males who are not employed full time, or have a low income, middle income neighbours have a positive marginal impact (relative to either high- or low-income neighbours).

7. Increases in middle-income neighbours will have a negative effect on high-income males if they substitute for high-income neighbours.

8. Smallest scale areas (10,000 m²) have strongest effects.

9. Recent, and continued cumulative exposure yields stronger associations than lagged, temporary ones.

10. There is distinct time decay (but some persistence) in the potential effects after exposure ceases.
The Netherlands

11. Higher median neighbourhood income is positively related to individual income prospects.

12. Income mix in the neighbourhood has a small positive effect.

13. A high share of rented dwellings relates to higher income gain than a high share of owner-occupied dwellings (possibly because the rented sector functions as a springboard rather than a trap).

14. For native Dutch, a high share of non-Westerners in the neighbourhood associates with a high income gain. The reverse is true for non-natives.

15. Limited albeit significant impacts exist of the socio-economic composition of the school on school achievement of secondary school children.
Typical policy responses to urban inequalities in European cities

- Fear for lack of integration and assumed relation with spatial inequalities
- Call for forced interventions to obtain reduction of segregation
- Policies aimed at creating balanced communities and social mix
- Instruments: urban restructuring and mixed tenure, mixed qualities and mixed house prices
Macro and managerial; social mix policy …

1. prevents the development of uncontrollable neighbourhoods and rising segregation

2. is a ‘conspiracy against the poor’: it produces gentrification, favours the affluent and displaces the poor

3. helps to improve local conditions and service levels

4. creates negative spill-over effects (displacement)

5. reduces stigmatisation through social mix

6. increases stigmatisation through selection of areas

7. reduces the accumulation of neighbourhood problems

8. improves neighbourhood liveability
Micro and individual; social mix policy …

1. helps the poor to realize social mobility through socialisation, role models, peers, and ‘better’ social networks through weak ties

2. stimulates economic, social and cultural participation and integration

3. destroys individual’s local social networks; spatial proximity is no guarantee for social integration

4. frustrates individual’s behaviour – especially of those who can afford – to sort into relatively homogeneous neighbourhoods

5. neglects metropolitan and state level impacts on social compositions
Comments on predominant policy interventions

• Social mix may indeed help social prospects
• Social mix may be good for some, but harming others.
• Segregation and ‘social mix’ are often weakly defined, if at all, and mostly used as metaphores, which blurs discussions.
• Fear often drives policies, which is a bad thing.
• Social mix does not work when micro-level social distances and social inequality are too large.
• Social mix may create injustice effects (due to reduction of affordable housing).
Conclusions

• Differences between cities relate to urban histories, welfare regimes, opportunities to adapt to economic transformation and globalisation.
• These differences produce different levels of social/ethnic (spatial) inequality.
• Which results in governmental intervention, strongest in universal welfare states
• Caution is required:
  – Interventions are good for some but bad for others
  – Spatial sorting is a strong process, difficult to engineer
  – Interventions may add to stigma
  – Interventions may produce negative externalities (spillovers and fear)
• Moderate segregation associates with universal welfare states; however, almost all of these states appear to be heading towards more neo-liberal models